Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
Most of the practical and theoretical debate about the …rms' organizational structure in vertically related markets has focused on two extreme alternatives, i.e., full vertical integration and separation. However, we often observe the presence of partial vertical integration, namely, partial ownership agreements in which a …rm acquires less than 100% of shares in a vertically related …rm (e.g., Allen and Phillips 2000; Fee et al. 2006; Rei¤en 1998) . Riordan (2008) reports that in 2003 News Corp., a major owner of cable programming networks in the US, acquired 34% of shares in Hughes Electronics, which operates via its wholly-owned subsidiary DirectTV in the downstream market of direct broadcast satellite services. Gilo and Spiegel (2011) provide empirical evidence that partial vertical integration is much more common than full integration in telecommunication and media markets in Israel. For instance, Bezeq operates in the broadband Internet infrastructure market and holds a share of 49.77% in DBS Satellite Services, which competes in the downstream multi-channel broadcast market.
Despite the empirical relevance of this phenomenon, little theoretical attention has been devoted to partial vertical ownership arrangements. In this paper, we investigate the incentive of an upstream …rm (manufacturer) to acquire a partial ownership stake in a downstream …rm (retailer). Our aim is to explore the scope for partial vertical integration and its competitive e¤ects.
We address this question in a setting where two manufacturer-retailer hierarchies engage in di¤erentiated good price competition and retailers are privately informed about their production costs. The economic literature has emphasized since Crocker's (1983) seminal contribution that a major problem within a supply hierarchy is that a …rm can have access to privileged information about some relevant aspects of the market.
In our framework, a manufacturer exclusively deals with its retailer, which is reasonable in the presence of product speci…c investments that have to be sunk before production decisions take place. 1 Moreover, bilateral contracting within the supply hierarchy is secret. This re ‡ects the natural idea that the trading rules speci…ed in a given contractual relationship cannot be observed by competitors. Alternatively, these rules can be easily (secretly) renegotiated if both parties agree to do so. 2 In the benchmark case of full information within the supply hierarchy, the manufacturer which can use non-linear (secret) contracts is indi¤erent about the ownership stake in its retailer. The manufacturer makes its retailer residual claimant for the hierarchy's pro…ts and extracts these pro…ts through a …xed fee. This restores the outcome of vertical integration irrespective of the ownership stake, and therefore vertical ownership arrangements are inconsequential.
This result does not hold any longer in the presence of asymmetric information about the retail costs. To begin with, consider a successive monopoly framework where a manufacturerretailer pair operates in isolation. It is well established in the economic literature (e.g., Gal-Or 1991c) that asymmetric information within a supply hierarchy entails a higher retail price to reduce the (costly) informational rents to the retailer. This reduces the hierarchy's e¢ ciency whose joint pro…ts are lower than under full information, and the manufacturer is therefore induced to fully integrate with its retailer in order to internalize the negative externality within the hierarchy.
This strict preference for full vertical integration does not carry over in a setting with di¤erent manufacturer-retailer pairs engaging in di¤erentiated good price competition. We show that in this setting partial vertical integration can emerge in equilibrium. In line with the successive monopoly case, a partial vertical ownership agreement entails an "information vertical e¤ect": the partial misalignment between the pro…t objectives of the manufacturer and the retailer entails allocative costs incurred to reduce the (costly) informational rents to the retailer. For a given retail price charged by the competitor, the higher price from allocative ine¢ ciency reduces the hierarchy's pro…tability relative to full integration. This form of double marginalization from asymmetric information translates into an opposite "competition horizontal e¤ect": the partially integrated hierarchy's commitment to a higher retail price than under full integration induces an accommodating behavior of the rival and strategically relaxes competition. The trade-o¤ between the bene…ts of softer competition and the costs of asymmetric information drives the equilibrium degree of vertical integration.
These results are presented in a fairly general setting without making any particular assumption on functional forms. Our analysis recommends a careful antitrust investigation into the competitive e¤ects of ownership agreements in vertically related markets.
Related literature
The private and social e¤ects of partial ownership agreements in horizontally related markets have been well explored in the economic literature (e.g., Gilo et al. 2006) . A seminal recent paper on this topic is Foros et al. (2011) , which shows that a …rm can prefer the acquisition of a partial ownership stake in a rival to full merger, if it obtains the corporate control over all price decisions.
Conversely, the literature on partial ownership in vertically related markets is still in its infancy. A relevant contribution is Dasgupta and Tao (2000) , which demonstrates that partial vertical ownership may perform better than take-or-pay contracts if the upstream …rms undertake investments which bene…t downstream …rms. However, Greenlee and Raskovich (2006) …nd that, under certain circumstances, partial vertical ownership interests do not have any e¤ect on the price or output choices of downstream …rms. 3 In this paper, we show that partial vertical integration constitutes a strategic devise to relax competition in the presence of asymmetric information about the retail costs.
Our analysis is also related to the literature about the strategic choice between vertical separation and integration when supply hierarchies compete. This issue has been investigated in a setting of complete information (e.g., Bonanno and Vickers 1988; Gal-Or 1991a; Jansen 2003) and, more relevantly for our purposes, in a context of asymmetric information. Caillaud and Rey (1994) provide an overview of the strategic use of vertical delegation. Gal-Or (1992) shows that, in the presence of asymmetric information about the retail costs, for intermediate costs of integration one …rm …nds it optimal to integrate while its rival remains vertically separated. Barros (1997) demonstrates that in an oligopolistic industry some …rms may pro…t from a commitment to face asymmetric information about their agents' operations. Along these lines, Gal-Or (1999) derives the conditions under which vertically related …rms follow di¤erent strategies about the integration or separation of their sale functions when asymmetric information concerns consumer demand. Di¤erently from the aforementioned contributions, we consider the manufacturer's option of "…ne-tuning" the degree of vertical integration by acquiring a (possibly) partial ownership stake in its retailer.
Our paper also belongs to the strand of literature dealing with vertical restraints under asymmetric information. In a successive monopoly framework with adverse selection, Gal-Or (1991c) compares quantity …xing and resale price maintenance contracts. Martimort (1996) investigates the choice of competing manufacturers between a common or exclusive retailer and 3 In a setting with an upstream homogeneous product and downstream imperfect competition, Hunold et al. (2012) show that passive (non-controlling) ownership of downstream …rms in upstream …rms is more pro…table than full merger. Gilo et al. (2013) …nd that partial ownership acquisitions can increase the risk of anticompetitive foreclosure relative to full integration.
shows that this choice depends on the degree of product di¤erentiation and the extent of the adverse selection problem. In a model with adverse selection and moral hazard, Martimort and Piccolo (2007) qualify the results of Gal-Or (1991c) according to the retailers'technology for providing services. In a setting with competing manufacturer-retailer pairs, Martimort and Piccolo (2010) and Kastl et al. (2011) show that manufacturers may strategically prefer quantity …xing over resale price maintenance contracts and investigate the welfare consequences of these contractual relationships.
Our contribution also shares some relevant similarities with the literature on strategic delegation in a competitive environment. However, contrary to the early work (e.g., Fershtman
and Judd 1987), we consider an asymmetric information setting with secret contracts (e.g., Martimort 1996) , where the terms of trade cannot be used for strategic purposes.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3 sets out the formal model. Section 4 considers the benchmark setting of a manufacturer informed about its retail costs, which is indi¤erent whether to integrate with its retailer or not. Section 5 investigates the case of asymmetric information and shows that the manufacturer can …nd it optimal to partially integrate with its privately informed retailer rather than fully integrate. In an illustrative example with explicit functions, Section 6 derives the equilibrium degree of partial vertical integration. Section 7 explores alternatives assumptions and the robustness of the results. Section 8 discusses some implications for the antitrust policy. Section 9 concludes. All formal proofs are provided in the Appendix.
The model
Setting We consider a vertically related market, where two upstream manufacturers, M 1 and M 2 , provide symmetrically di¤erentiated goods through two downstream retailers, R 1 and R 2 , which engage in price competition. We assume that each manufacturer is in an exclusive relationship with one retailer. To make the analysis as sharp as possible for our aims, in the spirit of Martimort and Piccolo (2010) we consider a setting where manufacturer M 1 and retailer R 1 exclusively deal with each other, while manufacturer M 2 is fully integrated with retailer R 2 . 4 Let q i (p i ; p i ) denote the (direct) demand function for good i = 1; 2, which is decreasing and (weakly) concave in its own price p i , i.e., , which implies that own-price e¤ects are larger than cross-price e¤ects. We also assume @ 2 q i @p i @p i 0, which ensures strategic complementarity in prices. 5 Manufacturing costs are normalized to zero.
Manufacturer M 1 o¤ers retailer R 1 a contract which speci…es a retail price p 1 for the good and a …xed franchise fee t 1 paid by the retailer to the manufacturer for the right to sell the good. 6 Retailer R 1 's (interim expected) pro…ts are
where 1 2 f l ; h g is the marginal retail cost, whose realization is private information of the retailer at the time the contract is signed. With probability 2 (0; 1) costs are l , while with probability 1 costs are h , where
the expected quantity of R 1 , which is conditional on its own retail costs 1 . This is because R 1 is uncertain about the rival's retail costs when contracting with M 1 but it can update its information on the basis of its cost realization. Speci…cally, in line with the main literature (e.g., Gal-Or 1991b Martimort 1996) , we allow for (weakly) positive correlation between retail costs. 7 In the example provided in Section 6, we assume perfect cost correlation, i.e., 1 = 2 .
Manufacturer M 1 's (interim expected) pro…ts are
which is a weighted sum of upstream pro…ts from the franchise fee t 1 and downstream pro…ts which is entitled to receive a share of the pro…ts of the acquired …rm. If = 0, the two …rms 5 This implies that the best response functions are positively sloped (Bulow et al. 1985) . We refer to Vives (1999, Ch. 6 ) for a full characterization of standard regularity conditions which ensure that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium outcome. 6 This contractual mode yields the manufacturer the highest pro…t. The practice of dictating the …nal price to a retailer is commonly known as resale price maintenance. As discussed in Section 7, our qualitative results are una¤ected if we consider a two-part tari¤ contract. 7 Positive correlation is reasonable in competitive markets, where costs are usually subject to common trends.
are perfectly separated. If 2 (0; 1), M 1 acquires an ownership share in R 1 , which means that the two …rms are partially integrated. If = 1, M 1 wholly owns R 1 , and full integration occurs.
We wish to derive the equilibrium degree of vertical integration between manufacturer M 1 and retailer R 1 , namely, the ownership stake that M 1 decides to acquire in R 1 . Following the main literature on partial ownership (e.g., Foros et al. 2011; Greenlee and Raskovich 2006; Hunold et al. 2012) , we assume that M 1 chooses the ownership stake in R 1 that maximizes the (expected) joint pro…ts of the two …rms. This ensures that M 1 can design an o¤er to R 1 which makes the shareholders in both …rms better o¤, so that they will …nd it mutually bene…cial to sign such an agreement. 8 Note that, if M 1 chose to maximize its pro…ts in (2), it could o¤er R 1 a new vertical ownership agreement that maximizes joint pro…ts together with a transfer which makes R 1 indi¤erent and it would be strictly better o¤. Therefore, a joint pro…t maximizing ownership agreement exhibits a higher commitment value. In Section 7, we qualify our results for the case where the manufacturer maximizes its own pro…ts when deciding on .
In order to focus on the strategic e¤ects of acquisition, we abstract from any cost savings arising from the ownership arrangement.
The (interim expected) pro…ts of the vertical structure M 2 R 2 are its own retail costs 2 whose realization is private information. The two competing supply hierarchies do not know the cost of each other but, as stressed before, costs are (weakly) positively correlated. 9
Contracting In line with the main literature on competing supply hierarchies (e.g., Gal-Or 1999; Martimort 1996; Martimort and Piccolo 2010, Kastl et al. 2011) , bilateral contracting within the hierarchy is secret. We invoke the revelation principle (e.g., Myerson 1982) in order 8 In a similar vein, Farrell and Shapiro (1990) suggest the criterion of joint pro…ts to derive the equilibrium ownership stake. This approach also re ‡ects the practice of takeovers and acquisitions. For instance, in the US a bidder that makes an o¤er to purchase less than 100% of the shares of a …rm must accept all shares tendered on a pro-rated basis. For additional details about the takeover process, we refer to Hunt (2009, p. 524) .
9 As it will become clear later, since M2 R2 is vertically integrated, our results fully carry over even when the upstream manufacturer M2 does not know the costs of its downstream division R2. Moreover, even though we allow for (possibly) di¤erent probability distributions for 1 and 2, we adopt the same expectation operator E (:) to simplify notation.
to characterize the set of incentive feasible allocations. In our setting, this means that, for any strategy choice of M 2 R 2 , there is no loss of generality in deriving the best response of M 1 within the class of direct incentive compatible mechanisms. Speci…cally, manufacturer M 1 o¤ers its retailer R 1 a direct contract menu
, which determines a …xed franchise fee t 1 (:) and a retail price p 1 (:) contingent on the retailer's report b 1 2 f l ; h g about its costs. This contract menu must be incentive compatible, namely, it must induce the retailer to report truthfully its costs, which implies b 1 = 1 in equilibrium. 10 It is worth noting that this contract mechanism is incomplete, since manufacturer M 1 cannot contract upon the retail price of the competitor M 2 R 2 . 11 This assumption, which is familiar in the literature (e.g., Gal-Or 1991a , 1991b , 1992 Martimort 1996; Martimort and Piccolo 2010; Kastl et al. 2011) , can be justi…ed on several grounds. For instance, a contract contingent on the retail price of the competitor may be condemned as collusive practice by antitrust authorities. 12
Timing The sequence of events unfolds as follows.
(II) R 1 and M 2 R 2 privately learn their respective retail costs 1 2 f l ; h g and 2 .
(III) M 1 secretly makes an o¤er
to R 1 . The o¤er can be either rejected or accepted by R 1 . 13 If the o¤er is rejected, each …rm obtains its outside option (normalized to zero), while M 2 R 2 acts as a monopolist. If the o¤er is accepted, R 1 picks one element within the contract menu by sending a report b 1 2 f l ; h g about the realized retail costs. Price competition with M 2 R 2 takes place and payments are made.
The solution concept we adopt is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, with the additional "passive beliefs" re…nement (e.g., Martimort 1996; Martimort and Piccolo 2010, Kastl et al. 2011 ).
Whenever R 1 receives an unexpected o¤er from M 1 , it does not change its beliefs about the 1 0 Since the manufacturer can obtain (a part of) the retailer's pro…ts, it might infer the value of the retail costs and design a penalty which extracts all pro…ts of the retailer following from cost misreporting. However, this penalty is unfeasible under a range of reasonable circumstances. The pro…t realization may be a¤ected by random shocks (occurring after …rms'decisions take place) which prevent the detection of the true costs. In the presence of limited liability, it would be hard to implement a …ne which deters cost misreporting. Furthermore, the …ne implemented by the manufacturer would have the only e¤ect of expropriating the pro…ts of the other shareholders of the retailer. This would be interpreted as a violation of their rights and condemned by antitrust authorities.
1 1 Similarly, the contract cannot be made contingent on any report from M2 R2 about its retail costs. 1 2 Alternatively, the retail price charged by the rival can be hard to observe or verify because of the lack of the proper auditing rights. We refer to Martimort (1996) for a discussion of this assumption.
1 3 This is justi…ed in the literature by assuming that a retailer is selected from a very large population of (equally ex ante e¢ cient) potential …rms, so that the manufacturer can dictate the terms of trade in the contract. equilibrium strategy of M 2 R 2 .
Proceeding backward, we …rst compute the retail prices in the competition stage for a given ownership stake. Afterwards, we derive the equilibrium ownership stake.
Benchmark: manufacturer fully informed about its retail costs
To better appreciate how the strategic value of partial ownership arrangements follows from the presence of asymmetric information, we …rst consider the benchmark case where manufacturer M 1 is fully informed about its retail costs.
We formalize the main results in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 If manufacturer M 1 is fully informed about the costs 1 of its retailer R 1 , the equi-
The equilibrium ownership stake that M 1 holds in R 1 is any 2 [0; 1].
The retail price of each supply hierarchy is set above marginal costs in order to equate (expected) marginal revenues with (expected) marginal costs from retailing.
The problem of manufacturer M 1 reduces to the problem of the vertical structure M 2 R 2 .
Since contracting is secret and cannot be used for strategic purposes, a fully informed manufacturer using non-linear contracts …nds it optimal to fully remove the double marginalization problem by making its retailer residual claimant for the hierarchy's total pro…ts, which are extracted through a …xed fee. As a result, the manufacturer achieves the outcome of full integration irrespective of the ownership stake , and the choice about the degree of vertical integration is inconsequential.
This conclusion does not hold any longer in the presence of asymmetric information.
The case of asymmetric information
We now consider the setting where retailer R 1 privately knows its costs. As discussed in Section 3, manufacturer M 1 can restrict attention to a direct incentive compatible contract menu
which induces retailer R 1 to truthfully reveal its costs, i.e., b 1 = 1 .
This contract menu can be written as f(t 1l ; p 1l ) ; (t 1h ; p 1h )g, where (t 1l ; p 1l ) and (t 1h ; p 1h ) represent the contracts designed for the e¢ cient and ine¢ cient retailer, with costs l and h respectively.
The competition stage
We …rst derive the retail prices for a given ownership stake. In addition to the participation constraints R 1l 0 and R 1h 0 for the e¢ cient and ine¢ cient retailer respectively, the contract o¤ered by manufacturer M 1 to retailer R 1 must satisfy the following incentive compatibility
Conditions (5) and (6) ensure that retailer R 1 does not bene…t from misreporting its costs.
The participation constraint R 1h 0 for the ine¢ cient retailer and the incentive constraint (5) for the e¢ cient retailer are binding at the optimal contract. 14 Substituting these binding constraints, M 1 's problem of maximizing its (expected) pro…ts in (2) can be formulated in the following way
where the two expressions in curly brackets are the manufacturer's pro…ts generated with the e¢ cient and ine¢ cient retailer, respectively.
Using (3), the problem of the vertical structure M 2 R 2 is
We now derive the retail prices for a given ownership stake .
Proposition 1 If retailer R 1 is privately informed about its costs 1 2 f l ; h g, the retail price charged by R 1 is p ai 1 2 p ai 1l ; p ai 1h , where p ai 1l and p ai 1h satisfy respectively
with ( )
1
. Furthermore, the retail price p ai 2 charged by the supply hierarchy
This yields the following lemma.
Lemma 2 It holds that (i)
Under asymmetric information, the e¢ cient retailer commands some informational rents in (5) which, as (7)) reveals, are costly for manufacturer M 1 when it does not full internalize the retailer's pro…ts, i.e., < 1. To reduce these rents, the price in (10) of the ine¢ cient retailer is distorted above the full information level, which generates allocative costs within the supply hierarchy. 15 The magnitude of this form of double marginalization from asymmetric information depends on the ownership stake that determines M 1 's degree of internalization of R 1 's pro…ts.
As Lemma 2 indicates, higher values for translate into a lower price of the ine¢ cient retailer, since M 1 internalizes to a larger extent R 1 's pro…ts. In particular, with a full acquisition of R 1 ( = 1), M 1 maximizes joint pro…ts in (7) and R 1 's rents are not costly any longer. This fully removes the informational costs and the retail price re ‡ects its full information level in (4).
The best response function of the e¢ cient retailer coincides with that under full information.
This is because the informational rents in (5) are independent of the price of the e¢ cient retailer and therefore manufacturer M 1 does not …nd it pro…table to implement any distortion. However, the price in (9) charged by the e¢ cient retailer generally di¤ers from the price in (4) under full information if < 1. To understand the rationale for this result, consider the price in (11) charged by M 2 R 2 . 16 Given strategic complementarity in prices, a lower value for , which entails an increase in the price charged by the ine¢ cient retailer, induces M 2 R 2 to set a higher price, as shown in Lemma 2. The e¢ cient retailer also increases its price in response to the higher price charged by the competitor.
It is worth noting that this result depends on the fact that M 2 R 2 cannot distinguish between the e¢ cient and ine¢ cient retailer and therefore it determines its price on the basis of the (conditional) expectation about the rival's retail costs. As we will see in Section 5, when costs are perfectly correlated, M 2 R 2 certainly knows the rival's costs, and therefore it does not distort its price when the retailer is e¢ cient. As a consequence, in this case both the price of M 2 R 2 and the price of the e¢ cient retailer re ‡ect their full information values.
The equilibrium ownership stake
Having derived the retail prices for a given ownership stake of manufacturer M 1 in its retailer R 1 , we can go back to the …rst stage of the game and determine the equilibrium ownership 1 5 The expression in square brackets in (10) is negative. This result is reminiscent of the rent extraction-e¢ ciency trade-o¤ in optimal regulation (e.g., Baron and Myerson 1982) .
1 6 The best response function of M2 R2 is also the same as under full information. This result would apply even under asymmetric information within the vertical structure, since manufacturer M2, which maximizes joint pro…ts, would not …nd it pro…table to distort the price of its privately informed division R2. stake. Since M 1 chooses how much of R 1 to acquire in order to maximize joint pro…ts, the equilibrium ownership stake is the solution to the following maximization program
We are now in a position to show our main results.
Proposition 2 If retailer R 1 is privately informed about its costs 1 2 f l ; h g, the equilibrium ownership stake that manufacturer M 1 holds in its retailer R 1 is ai < 1 whenever market demands are interdependent (
. Equivalently, partial vertical integration is more pro…table than full vertical integration. Full vertical integration, i.e., ai = 1, emerges in equilibrium if and only if market demands are independent (
Proposition 2 indicates that, in the presence of asymmetric information, M 1 is no longer indi¤erent about its ownership stake in R 1 . Speci…cally, when facing competition in the retail market, M 1 …nds it desirable to acquire an ownership interest in R 1 which is strictly lower than full ownership, i.e., ai < 1. We know from the discussion following Proposition 1 that a partial misalignment between pro…t objectives within the partially integrated hierarchy induces a higher retail price of the ine¢ cient retailer to reduce the (costly) informational rents to the e¢ cient retailer. For a given price charged by the competitor M 2 R 2 , this form of double marginalization from asymmetric information reduces the e¢ ciency of the supply hierarchy M 1 R 1 . These informational costs constitute what we call information vertical e¤ ect.
In the presence of price competition, this e¤ect translates into an opposite competition horizontal e¤ ect. The partially integrated hierarchy M 1 R 1 commits to a higher retail price than under full integration, which induces the competitor M 2 R 2 to raise its price as well.
Consequently, partial vertical integration acts as a strategic device to relax competition.
The equilibrium degree of integration trades o¤ the bene…ts of softer competition against the informational costs. Only if markets are independent and therefore there is no bene…t of softer competition, a pattern of full vertical integration that completely removes informational costs is clearly preferable. In the sequel, using explicit functions, we derive the equilibrium degree of vertical integration.
An illustrative example
For the sake of concreteness, we now consider a setting with explicit functions. Speci…cally, the consumer demand takes the following linear form
where and are positive parameters, and 2 [0; ) denotes the degree of substitutability between goods. 17 The pro…ts of retailer R 1 , manufacturer M 1 , and the vertical structure M 2 R 2 are respectively given by (1), (2), and (3), with retail costs being now perfectly correlated, i.e.,
The following lemma collects the main results with a fully informed manufacturer.
Lemma 3 If manufacturer M 1 is fully informed about the costs 1 of its retailer R 1 , the equi-
We know from Lemma 1 that, in the absence of asymmetric information, retail prices are set e¢ ciently. As costs are perfectly correlated, the equilibrium prices in (14) charged by the two supply hierarchies coincide.
We now turn to the problem under asymmetric information. Substituting (13) into (5) and (6), the incentive compatibility constraints can be written as
1 7 The system of demands in (13) follows from the optimization problem of a unit mass of identical consumers with a quasi-linear utility function y + U (q1; q2), where y is the Hicksian composite commodity and U (q1; q2) = a (q1 + q2) 
b 2 g 2 (e.g., Vives 1999, Ch. 6).
where p 1l and p 1h are the retail prices charged by R 1 , while p 2l and p 2h are the prices charged by M 2 R 2 , with costs l and h respectively. Under perfect cost correlation, R 1 and M 2 R 2 certainly know the costs of each other.
As in Section 5, we …rst derive the retail prices for a given ownership stake .
Proposition 3 If retailer R 1 is privately informed about its costs 1 2 f l ; h g, the retail price charged by R 1 is p ai 1 2 p ai 1l ; p ai 1h , where
1
. Furthermore, the retail price charged by the supply hierarchy M 2 R 2 is p ai 2 2 p ai 2l ; p ai 2h , where
Proposition 3 illustrates with explicit results the main insights gleaned from Proposition 1.
We know that the best response functions of the e¢ cient retailer R 1 and of the vertical structure M 2 R 2 coincide with those under full information. Note that the prices in (17) and (19) re ‡ect their full information values in (4). With perfectly correlated costs, M 2 R 2 certainly knows whether it faces the e¢ cient retailer, whose price is not distorted for rent reduction purposes.
Therefore, their prices are the same as under full information.
Conversely, the price in (18) charged by the ine¢ cient retailer can be in ‡ated above the full information level to reduce the informational rents to the e¢ cient retailer. The price di¤erence between (18) and (14) 
namely, a lower ownership stake exacerbates the price upward distortion. This is because M 1 internalizes to a lesser extent the pro…ts in (15) of the e¢ cient retailer and therefore is more inclined to curb these pro…ts via a price increase. For a given price charged by the competitor M 2 R 2 , the supply hierarchy M 1 R 1 becomes more ine¢ cient, since it obtains lower joint pro…ts. However, in the presence of price competition, the rival M 2 R 2 responds to a price change by adjusting its price in the same direction. In particular, di¤erentiating (20) yields
for > 0. A lower ownership stake of M 1 in R 1 translates into higher retail prices for both supply hierarchies. Note from (21) and (22) that the price response of M 2 R 2 to a change in is smoother than the price response of M 1 R 1 . Hence, even though the two supply hierarchies share the same retail costs, M 1 R 1 is weaker vis-à-vis its rival, since the price in (18) is higher than the price in (20) for < 1.
The following proposition illustrates the result of the trade-o¤ between the bene…ts of softer competition and the informational costs.
Proposition 4 If retailer R 1 is privately informed about its costs 1 2 f l ; h g, the equilibrium ownership stake that manufacturer M 1 holds in its retailer R 1 is
It holds ai < 1 whenever market demands are interdependent ( 6 = 0). In particular, we have
(ii) full vertical separation, i.e., ai = 0, otherwise.
Full vertical integration, i.e., ai = 1, is preferable if and only if market demands are independent ( = 0).
Proposition 4 indicates that, when market demands are interdependent, M 1 …nds it optimal to partially integrate with R 1 if the retailer is relatively likely to be e¢ cient ( ( ) increases with ). A higher probability of the e¢ cient retailer translates into larger expected (costly) informational rents and therefore higher informational costs within the hierarchy. If is high enough, M 1 is induced to acquire a partial …nancial interest in R 1 , which mitigates the informational distortions. For lower values of , the informational costs within the hierarchy are relatively small. In this case, M 1 fully separates from R 1 and bene…ts from softer competition by committing to the highest possible prices. Conversely, a pattern of full integration, which completely removes the informational costs, is optimal if and only if the hierarchy acts as a monopolist, since there is no bene…t of relaxing competition.
Note from (23) that an increase in the spread of retail cost distribution results in a higher ai . When the asymmetric information problem is more severe, the higher informational costs associated with R 1 's rents induce M 1 to mitigate these costs through a larger degree of vertical integration.
The result in Proposition 4 that the ownership stake of M 1 in R 1 is lower than 100% holds whenever market demands are interdependent ( 6 = 0). Hence, partial vertical integration can emerge in the presence of complementary goods ( < 0), which entail strategic substitutability in prices in a linear demand setting. As (21) and (22) indicate, a higher price of the ine¢ cient retailer R 1 arising from a lower ownership stake than under full integration translates now into a lower price for the complementary good provided by M 2 R 2 . This stimulates the output of M 1 R 1 , which is therefore better o¤.
Robustness
We now discuss some assumptions of the model to gain insights into the robustness of the results.
Derivation of the equilibrium value for the ownership stake
Following the main literature on partial ownership, we have derived the equilibrium ownership stake of M 1 in R 1 from the joint pro…t maximization problem. As discussed in Section 3, this ensures that M 1 can design an o¤er to R 1 which makes the shareholders in both …rms better o¤, so that they will …nd it mutually pro…table to accept this o¤er. We now examine the case in which M 1 , instead of caring about joint pro…ts, chooses in order to maximize the pro…ts in (2) it expects from the relationship with R 1 . Using (2) and the binding condition for R 1 's pro…ts in (5), the equilibrium value for is solution to the following maximization problem
This yields the following result.
Proposition 5 Suppose that manufacturer M 1 chooses the ownership stake in its retailer R 1 to maximize the pro…ts in (2) rather than joint pro…ts. If the probability of the e¢ cient retailer is relatively low and market demands are interdependent (
, then the equilibrium ownership stake is ai < 1.
Proposition 5 shows that, under certain circumstances, partial integration is more pro…table than full integration even though it is not the result of joint pro…t maximization. Speci…cally, M 1 does not acquire full ownership in R 1 when the e¢ cient retailer is relatively unlikely and therefore its (expected) informational rents are not too costly. A manufacturer which only cares about its own pro…ts when deciding on the ownership stake overestimates the informational costs relative to a joint pro…t maximizer, since it takes also into consideration the fact that it is not able to fully extract the pro…ts of its retailer. As a result, a full integration pattern which mitigates the informational costs may be preferred if the probability of the e¢ cient retailer is relatively high.
Fully integrated competitor
Another assumption that deserves further discussion is that M 1 faces the fully integrated competitor M 2 R 2 when deciding on the ownership stake in R 1 . Note that this modeling choice allows the investigation of the unilateral incentive to partially integrate in a setting which is biased in favor of the decision of full integration. The vertical structure M 2 R 2 does not have any negative externality from asymmetric information and can only bene…t from M 1 's higher price. This clearly mitigates M 1 's incentive to incur informational costs to commit to a higher price.
A more symmetric framework where both supply hierarchies are allowed to choose the ownership stake in their retailers would facilitate a commitment to higher prices via partial ownership agreements, which strengthens the outcome of partial vertical integration.
Resale price maintenance
The contract that manufacturer M 1 o¤ers to the retailer R 1 directly speci…es the retail price, which is known as resale price maintenance. Even though this type of vertical arrangements is sometimes viewed with skepticism by the antitrust authorities, some countries (e.g., New
Zealand) traditionally allow this practice if the bene…cial e¤ects can be shown to outweigh the anticompetitive harm. In the 2007 case "Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc., vs. PSKS,
Inc." the US Supreme Court held that resale price maintenance agreements are not per se unlawful, but must be judged under a "rule of reason", which allows a …rm to produce evidence that an individual resale price maintenance agreement is justi…ed. 18 Remarkably, our qualitative results do not depend on the use of resale price maintenance agreements. For instance, consider a contract which stipulates a two-part tari¤ with a unit input price and a …xed fee the retailer pays to the manufacturer. In the presence of asymmetric information, the manufacturer is inclined to distort upward the unit input price in order to reduce the informational rents to the e¢ cient retailer, according to the ownership stake acquired by the manufacturer in the retailer. This results in a higher retail price, which yields the tradeo¤ investigated in the paper.
Antitrust policy implications
Our analysis emphasizes the strategic use of partial ownership arrangements to relax competition. Despite the huge empirical literature on vertical integration (exhaustively surveyed by Lafontaine and Slade 2007) , more research is warranted on the impact of the …rms'organizational structure on competition. Using appropriate econometric techniques, the predictions of our model lend themselves for an empirically testable validation.
Our results recommend careful investigations into partial ownership agreements that can facilitate a dampening of competition. Furthermore, takeover regulations could facilitate full acquisitions relative to partial equity holdings. Antitrust authorities should allow partial ownership agreements when e¢ ciency bene…ts (for instance, in terms of cost savings) are expected to o¤set the anticompetitive e¤ects of …rms'strategic behavior.
Partial ownership agreements for strategic purposes will typically emerge in markets characterized by price competition. Therefore, we do not generally expect any strategic partial ownership when severe capacity constraints induce Cournot competition. This is because the partially integrated hierarchy's output reduction to curb informational rents entails a more aggressive behavior of the rival.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have investigated the scope for partial ownership agreements in vertically related markets where two manufacturer-retailer pairs engage in di¤erentiated good price competition and retailers are privately informed about their production costs.
A partial ownership stake of a manufacturer in its retailer, which introduces a misalignment between pro…t objectives of the two …rms, entails an upward price distortion for the ine¢ cient retailer to reduce the (costly) informational rents to the e¢ cient retailer. This form of double marginalization from asymmetric information reduces the supply hierarchy's e¢ ciency for a given price of the competitor.
This information vertical e¤ect translates into an opposite competition horizontal e¤ect.
The hierarchy's commitment to a higher price induces the rival to increase its price, which relaxes competition. The equilibrium degree of vertical integration trades o¤ the bene…ts of softer competition against the informational costs.
Our analysis explores the strategic incentive for partial vertical ownership and gives recommendations to the antitrust authorities when investigating mergers and acquisitions in vertically related markets.
be written as
where the constraint ensures the participation of R 1 in the contractual relationship with M 1 .
Since the maximand decreases with R 1 for any 2 [0; 1], we have R 1 = 0 in equilibrium.
Taking the …rst-order condition for
The system of the …rst-order conditions for M 1 and M 2 R 2 yields the expression in (4).
Proof of Proposition 1 . The results in the proposition immediately follow from the …rst-order conditions for p 1l and p 1h in the maximization problem in (2), and from the …rst-order condition for p 2 in the maximization problem in (8). We now show that the incentive constraint (6) is satis…ed in equilibrium. Substituting the binding incentive constraint (5) into (6), we
Since we have E q 1 p ai
h from Taylor's expansion, this expression can be rewritten after some manipulation in the following way
The expression in square brackets is (strictly) positive, since Finally, we check that the participation constraint R 1l 0 is also satis…ed in equilibrium. Note from the binding incentive constraint (5) that su¢ cient (but not necessary) condition for this to be the case is that either the degree of cost correlation or the level substitutability is not too high.
Proof of Lemma 2. Denoting by z the left-hand side of (10), the implicit function theorem
. Standard computations entail
where the inequality follows from the assumptions on the parameters of the model, p ai < 0 (second-order condition for p 1l ), it follows that
Denoting by f the left-hand side of (10) yields < 0 (second-order condition for p 1h ).
Denoting by g the left-hand side of (11) yields
. We have
where the inequality follows from the assumptions of the model, p ai 2 2 > 0, and 
Using (25) .
Note from (9) that the expression in the …rst line of (26) line is zero at = 1, which implies that < 1 is optimal. If @q 1 @p 2 = 0 (independent demands), the …rst-order condition (26) is zero for = 1, which is optimal (given that the second-order conditions are satis…ed).
Proof of Lemma 3. Using (1), M 1 's problem of maximizing (2) is de…ned by the binding constraint (15). Since for = 1 the expressions in the two curly brackets are negative (see the proof of Proposition 2), while the last term in the fourth line vanishes, su¢ cient (but not necessary) condition for the entire expression to be negative and therefore < 1 be optimal is that the probability is low enough.
